







Working Paper no. 66 
 
 






LEM-Laboratory of Economics and Management, Sant’Anna School of 






























Laboratorio R. Revelli, Collegio Carlo Alberto  Tel. +39 011 670.50.60 - Fax +39 011 670.50.61 
Via Real Collegio, 30 - 10024 Moncalieri (TO)  www.laboratoriorevelli.it - labor@laboratoriorevelli.it 
 









Administrative data from INPS (Italian Institute for Social Security) on Italian high tenure workers 
job-histories (15 years, from 1985 to 1999) is used to quantify  the temporal pattern of the effect of 
displacement on workers’ earnings, employment and wages. Moreover, I distinguish different 
groups of displaced workers (with respect the timing of displacement and its cause) and I also 
propose a picture of  the consequences of displacement  with respect to workers’ personal and firm-
related characteristics. I take into account unobserved heterogeneity by using an unobserved effects 
linear panel data model.  (JEL J65) 




The vast research on U.S. economy has showed that
1 displaced workers are likely to suffer long-
term earnings losses due to their job loss. As an example, Stevens (1997), in a national sample of 
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  1experienced displaced workers from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics,  estimated large and 
persistent earnings and wage losses: annual earnings fall approximately 25 percent in the year prior 
to job displacement and approximately 28 percent in the year of displacement with respect expected 
earnings of non-displaced workers. One year after displacement they remain 15 percent below 
expected levels and in the subsequent years losses are highly variable, ranging from losses of about 
3 to 12 percentage points, and show no clear tendency of fading away. These findings are 
qualitatively very similar to those obtained for a sample of Pennsylvanian workers by Jacobson, 
LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) (JLS), which can probably be considered the seminal paper in this 
field of empirical labor-market analysis.  
Also, displaced workers experience more non-employment than do non-displaced workers. 
However, if the earning and wage losses tend to be rather permanent, the difference in non-
employment spells tends to fade away in the long-medium run (Ruhm 1991, Fallick 1996). 
    A lot less has been done for Europe, and especially for Italy. The main problem that have made 
things difficult is the lack of adequate data, especially of long panels that could permit to take into 
account unobserved heterogeneity. Burda and Mertens (2001)  founds that in Germany full-time 
men displaced workers suffer, in the year following displacement, a reduction of wage growth of 
3.6% with respect to a reference group of continuously employed workers. Leonard and Audenrode 
(1995) analyze the cost of job loss for a sample of Belgian employees and estimate that wage losses 
upon re-employment are nearly zero. Likewise, Ackum (1991) finds no significant earnings loss in 
Sweden. Pichelmann and Riedel (1993) uncover wage losses for Austrian workers only in the short 
term. J.H. Abbring et al. (1999) don’t find much evidence of wage losses due to displacement in 
Netherlands. With respect Italy, Contini et al. (2006) compare (through cross-section OLS 
estimates) the wage growth of  displaced workers to that of  stayers for the period 1986-1991. They 
use INPS panel and  do find that displaced workers experience a lower wage growth. 
       Earnings, wages and employment outcomes of displaced workers may be expected to be worse 
than what they could have been if they had not been displaced for various reasons. Firstly, displaced 
workers could loose sectoral/firm specific skills they have accumulated or simply particularly good 
job matches. Secondly, there is the possibility that they lose industrial or union wage premiums or 
efficiency wages. Thirdly, the functioning of internal labor markets (promotion from within 
policies) or incentive pay mechanisms in the lost job can determine the impossibility of benefiting 
  2of the  future expected wage growth. Therefore a temporary worsening of the labor market 
outcomes of displaced workers, although relevant, is something physiologic and in conformity with 
the expected dynamics of the labor market. However, the persistence of  the negative consequences  
of displacement even in the long run could be more disturbing as it is a signal that displaced 
workers, and maybe the whole economy, have permanently loss some earnings potential. Such 
considerations could stimulate interest in providing appropriate assistance and training policies for 
displaced workers. Hence, studying how the degree of persistence of such losses vary between 
workers with different characteristics can give some hints in targeting and designing such policies. 
More in general, given that the typically adopted definition of displacement usually implies a 
structural cause for it (Fallick 1996), studying the effects of displacement on workers could provide   
microeconomic evidence on how the labor market reacts to structural changes, such as a sectoral 
reallocation of production and employment.  
       In this paper, I use administrative data from INPS (Italian Institute for Social Security) on 
Italian high tenure workers job-histories (15 years, from 1985 to 1999) to quantify  the temporal 
pattern of the supposed negative effect of displacement on workers’ earnings, employment and 
wages. Moreover, I distinguish different groups of displaced workers (with respect the timing of 
displacement and its cause) and I propose also a picture of  the such losses with respect to workers’ 
personal and firm-related characteristics. I take into account unobserved heterogeneity by using an 
unobserved effects linear panel data model.   The sample selection and econometric modeling 
choices will conservatively follow JLS’ strategies for two main motivations: to assure comparability 
of Italian results with the accumulated international evidence (on the consequences of displacement) 
and because of the source of this data is, as in the JLS’ study, administrative.  
 
       In Section II  I will describe the INPS-panel and define the groups of displaced workers we will 
analyze and the comparison group. In Section III I will lay out the econometric model and consider 
some potential sources of bias. In Section IV I will comment the estimation results. Section V 
contains some concluding summarizing remarks. 
 
 
  3II. Data  
 
Data comes from the INPS (Italian Institute for Social Security) administrative recordings for the 
period 1895-1999. It is a random sample of workers employed in the private-dependent sector of the 
Italian economy. I have data on the calendar beginning and closing dates and on the duration 
(number of weeks) for each employment-relationship. However it is not possible to consistently 
recover the quarterly or monthly temporal pattern of earnings or weeks in employment because for 
each employment-relationship we only observe the annual number of weeks in employment and the 
annual earnings without additional information on their temporal distribution. I have information on 
individuals (age, sex, place of birth, place of work, type of occupation) and on the firms (number of 
employees, date of birth and of death, sector) where they are employed. The structure of the panel is 
such that I can observe the main characteristics of both employees and firms, but I cannot observe 
all the employees belonging to a single firm. Therefore, I only observe the characteristics of a firm 
to the extent that some worker present in our sample is employed in it. The dependent variables of 
interest are weekly real wages, the number of weeks worked in a year and annual real earnings. It is 
also important to understand that annual earnings, besides the annual compensation for the actually 
worked weeks, also contains: 1) repayments for accumulated  vacations 2) back-payments due to 
law or contract 3) annual bonuses as the “tredicesima” 4) CIG’s and CIGS’ compensations
2. To take 
into account this fact and the possibility that workers hold multiple jobs in a given year, I will 
consider two different real weekly wage variables. The first wage variable, defined aggregate 
weighted weekly wage (aww), is the average of real weekly earnings from all sources  weighted by 
the number of weeks worked in the particular job. 
The second wage variable is aimed to take into account the fact that during the year of mobility 
the earnings of the mover at the old job could be inflated by some of its components that are 
traditionally higher during the last year of employment in a particular firm: repayments for 
accumulated  vacations and back-payments due to law or contract. Moreover, the importance of 
these components is positively correlated with the tenure of the worker at the left firm (and, as I will 
explain, the movers contained in the retained sample have at least seven years of tenure). A feasible 
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  4strategy is to exclude, during the year of mobility, from the weighted weekly wage variable of 
movers  the weekly earnings from the left firm (if and only if during such year the worker resulted 
successively employed in a different firm). The resulting wage variable is called aggregate adjusted 
weighted weekly wage (aaww). 
     
Workers of the construction sector are excluded due to the high seasonality of their jobs.   
Besides, I will keep out from the sample also workers that experienced displacement or change job 
before or during year 1991 and part-time workers before or during 1991
3. The real earnings and real 
wages are expressed at 1995 prices using the IPC (“Indice dei prezzi al consumo”) index provided 
by ISTAT (Italian Institute of Statistics).  Since workers may hold more than one job in a given 
year, we will compare our estimates for the main job-earnings and worked weeks with other 
estimates that take into account all jobs that are held during the year. The main job is defined 
according to the number of weeks worked and, in case of ties, the main job is the one that provided 
the highest earnings during the particular year. During the year of displacement (or of mobility), the 
main job is the job held in the downsized or closed firm (or in the left firm). I expect that using as 
dependent variable only the earnings or the worked weeks of the main job in a given year (defined 
as main job earnings and main-job worked weeks) instead of the aggregate annual earnings or the 
aggregate worked weeks will give higher estimated displacement costs  if displaced workers are 
more likely to hold multiple positions in a given year than non-displaced workers.  
The sample of displaced workers will be formed by employees of firms that closed their activity 
(in the year of closing or in the previous year) or experienced a significant reduction in the number 
of employees (at least -40%) during the year of the “observed separation”.  We will initially 
differentiate between four groups of displaced workers: those displaced from closing firms during 
the year of firm-closure (defined ultimately displaced workers); separators from closing firms 
during the year preceding firm-closure (defined pre-closing separators); those separated from firms 
that during the same year experienced a significant reduction (40% or more) in the number of 
employees (defined mass-layoffs).  The workers belonging to the first group cannot be clearly 
contained also in the second group, but they are all contained in the third group. Therefore, to 
                                                 
3 To account for the heterogeneity of post-separation paths we prefer not to erase this possible post separation outcome. 
  5understand better the difference between the consequences of displacement due to plant-closure and 
those due to mass-layoffs without plant-closure, I will form a fourth group: workers that were 
exposed only to a mass layoff  that is not linked to a firm-closure (defined only-mass-layoffs).
 4 
However, in practice, we are not sure that all pre-closure separators left their firms for a reason 
connected with the impending closure. The only information I have to evince if a certain separation 
can be considered a displacement is the evolution of  the number of employees in the firm during 
the year preceding the closure. Therefore, I will include a worker that leaved his firm in the year 
preceding its closure in the pre-closing separators group if and only if  during this year there was a 
net reduction in the number of employees. In many studies the common practice is to assume that 
the closing process lasts one year; however some studies have begun to criticize this assumption 
and to identify displaced workers using a window longer than one year. Bender, Dustmann, 
Margolis and Meghir (2002) consider firm closure a two year process without taking into 
consideration employees flows. Eliason and Storrie (2003) additionally analyze employees flows to 
understand the duration of the closing processes and, finally, consider  firm closure a two year 
process.    
I will compare these workers to a control group formed by workers that didn’t experience a mass 
layoff or a firm-closure (or a pre-closure separation) along all the sample period. I think this is a 
better choice than that of using only workers that additionally maintain their initial jobs for all the 
years under scrutiny (or that don’t experience periods of non-employment), because the comparison 
group is aimed to be representative of the counterfactual situation of displacement. Therefore, the 
control group should represent the hypothetical (and not observed) outcomes of the same displaced 
workers if they simply didn’t experience the involuntary job loss, without additionally (and 
arbitrarily) ruling out that they would experience a job change (or non-employment). However, it is 
also important to point out that the control group described above could be exposed to the inclusion 
of individuals that were laid off on an individual basis
5, that I cannot take into account due to the 
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distinguish contemporaneously between these groups. See for example: Kriechel and Hamermesh, 2001; Lengermann 
and Vilhuber, 2002; Schwerdt, 2005. 
5 In a paper in which they develop a asymmetric-information model of layoff, Gibbons and Katz (1991) find evidence 
that workers displaced on an individual basis fare worse than workers displaced in a plant closing. The theoretical 
explanation is connected to a “lemons” effect by which individual lay-offs function as adverse signals about the 
workers’ productivity. On the other hand, it could also be that local labor markets are affected by the inflow of 
  6administrative nature of the data. In any case, the estimates I will provide in this paper are not 
sensitive to exclusion from the control group of the employees whose separations are not related to 
mass-layoffs or firm closures (defined other movers). Moreover, in the Italian case, mass-layoffs 
and/or job losses due to firm closure can probably be considered more representative of the whole 
population of high tenure displaced workers than it happens for less stringent EPL countries, as for 
example in the U.S. case, where individual layoffs of high tenure workers are, given the lower firing 
costs and legal restrictions, presumably more common. 
As a final sample restriction, that is valid for the control group and for all the other groups of 
movers, I will consider only workers that in 1991 have at least seven years of tenure (or more, given 
that tenure for the majority of workers is censored at year 1985) with their current firm. This choice 
is made firstly to guarantee comparability with the other international studies and, secondly, 
because high-tenure workers are the most likely to suffer from job-displacement as they have higher 
probability to have accumulated firm (or sector) specific human capital and/or to maintain their jobs 
simply because of  they are particularly good matches. Internal labor markets (promotion from 
within policies) and incentive pay mechanisms are other two sources of earnings losses that increase 
their effects with tenure. 
The main drawback of INPS panel is that workers that result non-employed in the private-
dependent sector could have found other jobs via self-employment or working in the Agricultural or 
Public sectors. Moreover there is also the possibility that workers simply retired or end up in the 
shadow economy. Therefore, if other movers earn more than displaced workers outside private 
dependent sectors, imputing zero earnings to all persons that result non-employed in the private 
dependent sectors would imply understating displaced workers’ losses. For example, it could be that 
other movers are more likely than displaced workers to be employed out of the private dependent 
sectors. However, I have additional administrative data (“Self-employment” archives, “Pensions” 
archives and “Quasi-dependent” archives) about retirement, self-employment and quasi-dependent 
employment (i.e., atypical labor contracts). Even if it is impossible to reconstruct workers earnings 
                                                                                                                                                                  
relatively similar job seekers deriving from a firm-closure. If the “lemons” explanation of Gibbons and Katz and/or the 
“local labor market” hypothesis were applicable to the Italian labor market, the samples of displaced workers 
considered above could not be taken as representative of the whole population of displaced workers, as it happens for 
all the studies that are based on administrative data. Survey based data don’t have this kind of disadvantage, but they 
have the problem of relying on workers’ (or firms’) self reported reasons for why a separation occurred.   
  7outside the private dependent sectors (apart from pensions, there is no relevant information about 
earnings deriving from self-employment and quasi-dependent employment), this additional 
information will be useful to understand the possible outcomes of workers that leave INPS sample. 
JLS faced the same problem with their administrative data on Pennsylvanian workers. They decided 
to set the sample restriction that workers have positive earnings during all years and, as a 
consequence, they eliminated about 40% of their sample of high tenure displaced workers. In this 
paper I will follow the same approach. This sample restriction, in  this case, eliminated about 50% 
of high tenure displaced workers. A large majority of these workers (about 70%) never had any 
positive reported earnings after their job losses. Because the probability to be non-employed is 
likely to be higher for displaced workers (that disappear from the panel) than for simply movers 
(that disappear from the panel), I think that this sample restriction biases downward the estimated 
losses due to displacement
6. 
Table 1 reports workers’ characteristics in the year-job of mobility (for the following groups: 
ultimately displaced, mass-layoffs, only mass-layoffs, pre-closing separators and other movers) or 
during the last eight years covered by the sample (for the control group)
7. The descriptive 
information correspond to the main-jobs characteristics. 
  I include only the first observed job displacement for each individual during the relevant period. I 
do not separately include additional displacements for these workers because, as common in the 
literature, I consider future displacements as a cost of the initial displacement
8.  
The last group of workers that appears in the table, defined other movers, is formed by persons 
that change job for reasons not related to mass-layoffs or plant-closures. These residual movers 
could be either simple quitters or additional displaced workers (i.e., persons fired individually I 




                                                 
6 See appendix A.5 
7 Given that I consider displacement (or mobility) only if it happens after 1991, I made this choice to assure the 
comparability of all the groups.  
8 The analysis of the consequences of multiple displacements on earnings losses in Italy is left to future work. However, 
preliminary results show that, as expected, workers subject to multiple displacement fare worst. See Stevens (1997) for 
this kind of analysis applied to U.S. data. 














20-29 11%  10%  7%  2%  4%  5% 
30-39 40%  41%  44%  41%  31%  31% 
40-49 39%  39%  39%  52%  47%  47% 
Age 
categories 
>49 10%  10%  10%  5%  18%  17% 
Median age  39 39  39 40 43  43 
Mean age  39.4 39.5  39.7 40.2 42.6  42.3 
blue collars  66%  68%  72%  41%  55%  51% 
Occupation 
white collars  34%  32%  28%  59%  45%  49% 
male 62%  64%  67%  80%  74%  80% 
Sex 
female 38%  36%  33%  20%  26%  20% 
manufacturing 64%  65%  68%  87%  70%  77% 
Industry 
services 36%  35%  32%  13%  30%  23% 
North 66%  64%  63%  68%  62%  61% 
Center 18%  18%  17%  9%  20%  21%  Location 
South-Islands 16%  18%  20%  23%  18%  18% 
Number of observations  596 759  163  46  69,984  2,442 
Average annual aggregate earnings  16,576 16,550  16,453 21,902 21,320  22,113 
Average annual main-job earnings  15,913 15,955  16,111 21,747 21,223  21,777 
Main as % of aggregate  earnings  96.0 96.4  97.9 99.3 99.5  98.5 
Average annual aggregate worked weeks   49.0 48.9  48.4 50.1 50.6  50.6 
Average annual main-job worked earnings  47.1 47.2  47.4 49.7 50.4  49.8 
Main as % of aggregate worked weeks  96.1 96.5  97.9 99.2 99.6  98.4 
Aggregate weighted weekly wage  341 340  337 433 421  435 
Aggregate adjusted weighted weekly wage  335 334  333 431 420  432 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
           
   
Given that the number of workers displaced during a mass layoff not followed by the closure of the 
firm is relatively small, the figures of table 1 don’t reveal relevant dissimilarities between the 
characteristics  of the workers belonging to the ultimately displaced and mass-layoffs  groups. 
However, with respect to the control group, these groups have higher percentages of female workers 
and of blue-collars.  Moreover, as the groups of pre-closing separators and of only mass-layoffs, 
ultimately displaced workers and mass-layoffs tend to be younger than never displaced workers and 
other movers. With respect the other characteristics displayed in table the differences are minor. 
The more relevant peculiarities of the only-mass-layoffs with respect ultimately displaced workers 
are higher percentages of blue collars, of men and of manufacturing workers. Moreover, other less 
  9quantitatively relevant differences that characterize only-mass-layoffs with respect ultimately 
displaced workers are the location (the only-mass-layoffs group have a greater percentage of 
workers located in the south) and the age (only-mass-layoffs tend to be older). 
Workers that separates the year preceding the closure of their firm (pre-closing separators) are 
characterized by  the highest percentages of workers located in the north, of workers belonging to 
the age group “40-49”, of workers employed in the manufacturing sectors, of white-collars and of 
men (with respect all the other groups). The characteristics of other movers tend to be similar to 
those of the control group. However, other movers tend to be younger and to have a higher 
percentages of white collars, of men and of workers belonging to the manufacturing (with respect to 
those of the control group). 
Table 1 also reports the average real annual earnings, real weekly wages and worked weeks of 
the various groups for the fifteen years covered by the sample. Other movers have the highest 
average annual earnings and weekly wages and they are followed by: pre-closing separators, control 
group, ultimately displaced, mass-layoffs and only-mass-layoffs. Looking at the difference between 
average annual aggregate earnings and average annual main-job earnings it appears that pre-closing 
separators, other movers and the workers belonging to the control group are more attached to the 
main job and/or have less needs to integrate the main job earnings with respect the other groups of 
displaced workers. As expected, the difference between the values of these two earnings variables 
seems especially relevant for the first three groups of displaced workers.  
With respect to average annual aggregate worked weeks, the best performing groups are the 
control group and other movers, that are followed by: pre-closing separators, ultimately displaced 
workers, mass-layoffs and only-mass-layoffs. This is not surprising given the fact that the control 
group contain also workers that never changed job during 1985-1999 and that displaced workers are 
likely to experience non-employment as a consequence of displacement (at least in the short run). 
Looking at the difference between average annual aggregate worked weeks and average annual 
main-job worked weeks it is confirmed, also in terms of worked weeks, that pre-closing separators, 
other movers and the workers belonging to the control group are more attached to the main job 
and/or have less needs to integrate the main job earnings with respect the other groups of displaced 
workers. 
  10The last two rows of Table 1 show the real weekly weighted wages. As for earnings and worked 
weeks, the last three groups (control group, other movers and pre-closing separators) appear better-
off with respect the other groups of workers (ultimately displaced workers, mass-layoffs and only 
mass-layoffs). Moreover, as expected,  are lower than  for all the groups.  aaww aww
Summing up, these simple descriptive statistics show that, for high tenure Italian workers, job 
displacement is more common among women, unskilled workers and younger workers.
9 Moreover, 
it appears that workers belonging to the control group, other movers and pre-closing separators 
differ from workers belonging to the other groups of displaced workers more in terms of wages than 
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Figure 1. Real aggregate earnings percentage growth (reference year 1985). 
                                                 
9 This evidence, with the exception of the finding about the gender dimension, conforms with non Italian patterns in the 
incidence of job displacement. See for example Kuhn et al. (2002), Fallick (1996) and Kletzer (1998). In a companion 
paper, I will provide more accurate estimates of the incidence of job displacement in Italy without limiting the analysis 
to high tenure workers and considering all individual displacements (not only the first one as in this case) and using 
regression analysis. 
  11Let’s now have a preliminary look at the crude evidence about aggregate earnings dynamics 
(during the period 1985-1999) for the groups of workers we have formed and which, in the next 
sections, will be object of a more rigorous analysis. Figure 1 depicts the real aggregate earnings 
percentage growth (with respect 1985 real aggregate earnings) for the groups in which I have 
divided this random sample of high tenure workers.  
The dynamics of real aggregate earnings for the control group reflects the very favourable Italian 
macroeconomic conditions between 1985 and 1991 (in this period Italian economy grew with an 
average annual real GDP growth of about 2.5%) and the subsequent slowdown during 1992-1993.  
During 1994-1995 real aggregate earnings and real Italian GDP  begin another time to grow; they 
suddenly stops their ascending trajectory in 1996; they return to the pre-1992 growth-performance 
only during 1997 and then start a more moderate  growth period.    
Figure 1 shows that in the pre-mobility period (1985-1991) all groups of workers, with the 
exception of pre-closing separators and only mass-layoffs, display similar real aggregate earnings 
growth-paths. However, it is also evident that the difference between the growth paths of, on one 
side, other movers and control group workers and of, on the other side, mass-layoffs and ultimately 
displaced, widens as  the mobility period (1992-1999) approaches. This phenomenon could be due 
to the fact that the events that lead to workers’ displacements, i.e. the bad economic situations of 
their firms, negatively influence workers’ earnings. The growth path of  the workers belonging to 
the only mass-layoffs group appears instead very different from those of the other groups from the 
beginning. Pre-closing separators’ earnings dynamics resembles those of other movers and of the 
control group. However, during the in the pre-mobility period (1985-1991), they tend to be 
relatively better-off.  
During the mobility period (1992-1999) the difference between the earnings growth paths of, on 
one side, other movers, control group workers and pre-closing separators, and of, on the other side, 
mass-layoffs, ultimately displaced workers and only mass-layoffs enlarges: this preliminary 
descriptive statistics suggests that displaced workers, with the important exception of pre-closing 
  12separators, do loose in term of earnings with respect to the control group. Pre-closing separators and 





































ultimately displaced  mass layoffs only mass layoffs
pre-closing separators other movers control group
Figure 2. Real weekly wage percentage growth (reference year 1985). 
 
Figure 2 shows that during the first three years (1986-1988) all groups of workers, with the 
exception of pre-closing separators, display very similar real weekly wage growth-paths. The 
difference between the growth paths of, on one side, other movers and control group workers and 
of, on the other side, mass-layoffs, only mass-layoffs and ultimately displaced, widens as  the 
mobility period (1992-1999) approaches. Another time, this phenomenon could be due to the fact 
that the events that lead to workers’ displacements, i.e. the bad economic situations of their firms, 
                                                 
10 Tentative explanations to these phenomenon together with its implications for the consistency of the estimates of the 
earnings losses due to displacement  will be given in the next paragraph.   
 
  13negatively influence workers’ wages. The growth paths of  pre-closing separators appear instead 
very different from those of the other groups (especially from the other groups of displaced 
workers) from the beginning.  
During the mobility period (1992-1999) the difference between the wage growth paths of, on one 
side, other movers, control group workers and pre-closing separators, and of, on the other side, 
mass-layoffs, ultimately displaced workers and only mass-layoffs tend to be larger and increasing
11. 
Also this preliminary descriptive statistics about wages suggests that displaced workers, with the 
important exception of pre-closing separators, do loose with respect to the control group. As it 
happened for earnings, pre-closing separators and only-mass-layoffs groups are, respectively, the 
best and the worst performing groups
12. 
In conclusion, it is important to underline two points that emerge from this descriptive statistics. 
This preliminary analysis suggests that the labor market characteristics (that we have observed in 
table 1, figure 1 and figure 2)  of  pre-closing separators are very different from those of  ultimately 
displaced workers and that it is necessary to account for this fact if we really want to understand the 
consequences of firm closures on workers. The pre-closing separators group is relatively more 
skilled  and have relatively greater percentages of men, of manufacturing workers and of older 
workers. Moreover, with respect to wage and earnings dynamics, pre-closing separators are 
relatively better-off. Another important preliminary finding is related to the  discrepancy between 
the characteristics of only-mass-layoffs and those of ultimately displaced workers: workers 
displaced due to firm closure appear to be different from workers displaced during a mass-layoff 
not connected to a firm closure. The only-mass-layoffs group is comparatively less skilled and have 
greater percentages of men, of manufacturing workers and of older workers. Moreover, with respect 




                                                 
11 However, we can also notice that during the slowdown period (1992-1993) the wage growth paths of the various 
groups  tend to be more compressed. 
12 Tentative explanations to these phenomenon together with its implications for the consistency of the estimates of the 
wage losses due to displacement  will be given in the next paragraph.   
 
  14III. Econometric model 
 
We will use data of workers that are displaced at some point in the sample (  = 1) and data 
about the comparison group of workers that  have  never  been  displaced  in  the  sample  period        
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Where:  
•  Q is the number of regressors. 
•  t i, ψ  is a vector containing all the regressors for individual i at time t ,  but the individual 
specific   i α . 
•  t i, ψ ∆  is a vector containing the individually first-differenced regressors.                                                        
•  Yit is the log of the relevant dependent variable. 
•  The set of dummy variables   represents the occurrence of the event of  displacement; in 
particular is the effect of displacement on workers’ or earnings K years following (or, if K is 
negative, prior to) its occurrence. These coefficients, multiplied by one hundred,  approximate
K
t i D ,
K δ
13 the 
percentage losses of displaced workers (belonging to the different groups we will take into account) 
in term of annual earnings (or weekly wages or worked weeks) with respect to the expected 
earnings (or weekly wages or worked weeks) of never-displaced workers belonging to the control 
group.  
•  Xit is a vector of time varying factors, taken alone and interacted, influencing the worker’s 
basic exogenous earnings potential (sex, age, age squared and interactions) that cannot be 
influenced by the treatment (i.e., displacement).  Given the fact that only age is not constant over 
                                                 
δ 13 The exact percentage effect on earnings is calculated using the estimates of the relevant coefficients as:  .  1 −
K
e
  15time and that we will employ the FD estimation technique, we will have that only age-terms and 
age-interacted terms remain in X.  Though I don’t have data on educational attainment, by using the 
model (1) I will take it into account to the extent that this unobserved heterogeneity is time-
invariant. Other factors that may change over time also as a result of displacement, such as those 
related to the firm/industry of the worker, the experience/tenure dimensions or to the blue/white 
collar type of occupation of the worker, are not included in Xit in order to pick up the full 
“unconditional” effect of displacement. More importantly, if we include in Xit information about 
non-ignorable
14 workers’ characteristics that could vary as a  consequence of displacement, we 
would depart from the needed strict exogeneity assumption  A.1 that is a necessary condition for 
consistency. To clarify the matter, let’s imagine a two period example in which the sector of 
occupation of the worker (defined  ) is an observable non-ignorable time-varying characteristic. 
A worker is displaced at time 1 ( ) and, as a consequence of it, change her type of 
occupation at time 2. Reframing assumption A.1 in  terms of conditional expected earnings and 
adapting it to this example, what we have argued can be expressed by the following inequality: 
. For our hypothesized worker 
displaced at time 1 that, at time 2, is forced to change sector by the event of displacement, it is clear 
that knowing the previous sector of occupation is for sure an additional significant information: 
comparing the time 2  sector with the time 1 sector gives us additional relevant information about 
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it time varying 
factors that can be influenced by displacement.    
•  The  t γ ’s  are the coefficients of calendar year dummy variables  that are aimed to control 
for the general time pattern of or earnings in the whole economy.  
•  i α  is a time-invariant individual fixed effect that is meant to control for unobserved time-
constant workers’ characteristics that could influence their earnings
15.        
                                                 
14 A non-ignorable characteristic is a characteristic that is correlated with the dependent variable.  
15 I have also tried another specification, a random growth model, i.e. I have added to the independent variables of the 
basic model (1) individual specific time trends that should control for unobserved heterogeneity that could influence 
workers’ rate of  earnings growth. I have estimated this model by first differencing (to eliminate the additive effect i α ) 
and then using the within transformation to eliminate the random trend. However the estimated coefficients resulted 
  16•  Choosing g means imposing that there are no effects of displacement from g years before 
displacement backwards. Therefore, we expect that, if we have carefully controlled for all the         
non-ignorable observables and non-observables variables influencing differences in the relevant 
dependent variables between the control and the treated groups, the parameter  K δ  at K = -g will not 
be significantly different from zero. Consequently, estimates of the displacement effect during the 
pre-separation years  may be used as an informal specification test of the model. I have set g = f = 7. 
       In general, bias in the model could occur if the groups of displaced workers are not random 
samples in terms of non-ignorable (observable and unobservable) characteristics we don’t control 
for (i.e., observable time-varying characteristic not contained in Xit and unobservable time-varying 
characteristics). Therefore, finding relevant and persistent displacement effects during all the years 
preceding displacement could signal that also (or only) other factors, different from displacement, 
are determining such losses, i.e. a causal interpretation of the estimated  is not warranted. 
K δ
A first source of bias could arise if firms tend to lay-off selectively workers whose performance 
was poor in the year(s) before separation (defined selected lay-offs hypothesis). In terms of our 
model this would imply a correlation between the dummies indicating a mass-layoff (and/or a pre-
closure separation) and the error term. Therefore, the importance of the consequential biases would 
depend on the time series properties of the error
16.  
Moreover, if workers have information on the future closure of their firm, another process of 
selection could take place. Workers will probably try to find another job and, consequently, 
separations registered in the year before firm-closure could be pre-emptive quits. One could suspect 
that those who succeed in that search process will tend to have comparatively “better” labor market 
characteristics (as an example they could simply have more job-search ability or better labor market 
connections) than those remaining till the “bitter end” and therefore that they will be affected 
comparatively less by the closure of the firm. Comparing estimated wage losses for the group of 
pre-closure separators to those for ultimately displaced workers we can try to evince what kind of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
very sensitive to the exclusion (or inclusion) of the lags and/or leads dummies indicating displacement, and,  using an F-
test, the individual specific time trends resulted very insignificant. Therefore, I opted  for the specification (1). 
 
16 If such correlation does exist at the moment of displacement, the most favorable case  would be the stationarity of the 
errors around the year of displacement. See JLS for a throughout discussion about the properties of the error term and 
the resulting biases. 
  17selection process is dominating. If the estimated wage losses for pre-closure separators are lower 
than those for ultimately displaced workers it probably means that pre-closure separations are 
principally the result of a selection process characterized by pre-emptive quits (defined auto-
selection hypothesis). If instead the estimated earnings losses for pre-closure separators are greater 
than those for ultimately displaced workers it probably means that pre-closure separators are 
principally the result of a selection process characterized by “low-quality” workers layoffs (the 
selected lay-offs hypothesis)
17. In the last sentences I have used the word “probably” because a third 
possibility is that even the selected pre-closure separations
18 could be not connected to the 
impending closure. If this third possibility holds, we could simply regard the estimated earnings 
losses for the group of ultimately displaced workers  as the cost of displacement due to plant 
closure. If it doesn’t hold, finding lower/greater earnings losses for pre-closure separators would 
mean that  the estimated earnings losses for the group of ultimately displaced workers 
overestimate/underestimate the cost of displacement due to plant closure. Therefore, a way for a 
cautious solution to this problem could be to form a group of workers that separate from the closing 
firm in the year of firm-closure or in the previous  year, i.e. the union of pre-closure separators and 
ultimately displaced workers (defined 2 years window closure displaced workers, 2 y.w.c.d.w.). 
Then, if the estimated losses of pre-closure separators are lower/higher than those of ultimately 
displaced workers, I will regard the estimates concerning ultimately displaced workers as 
upper/lower bound estimates of the effect of displacement due to plant closure and the estimates for 
2 y.w.c.d.w.  group as lower/upper bound estimates.  
 
      The next step will be to look at these figures from the perspective of the pre-displacement 
characteristics of workers (and their firms) and the post displacement mobility outcomes. The 
simpler strategy is to interact the displacement dummies of regressions (1) with variables 
representing the worker/firm characteristics we are interested in. The pre-displacement 
characteristics and the post-displacement mobility outcomes we consider are the following: 
                                                 
17 According to the descriptive statistics, I would naturally propend for the first hypothesis. 
18 Remember from paragraph II that I have included a worker that leaved its firm during the year preceding its closure 
in the pre-closing separators group if and only if  during this year there was a net reduction in the number of employees. 
  18- Blue Vs White collars: the type of occupation at the left job (that, presumably, is correlated with  
the skill dimension); 
- Males Vs Females; 
- Age: I will divide the sample of displaced workers in three categories (less than 30 years old, 
between 30 and 40 years old, more than 40 years old) according to the age at the moment of 
displacement; 
- Manufacturing Vs Services workers: according to the sector of the firm of displacement; 
- Firm size: displaced workers that are displaced from a firm that, at the end of the year preceding 
displacement
19, has more or less than 18 employees; 
- Local labor market conditions: I will differentiate between local labor markets (corresponding to 
Italian regions) that, during the year of displacement, have an unemployment rate greater or lower 
than the Italian average; 
- Change sector: I will differentiate between workers that change their sector of employment or that 
don’t (reference jobs are the sector of the job of displacement and the sector of the first post 
displacement job); 
- Change type of job: I will differentiate between workers that change their type of job and workers 
that don’t (reference jobs are the job of displacement and the first post displacement job). 
 
    However, to reduce parameters, I will use a different strategy to build the dummy variables 
indicating displacement. I will use only three dummies: one for the pre-displacement years (Pre),  
one for the year of displacement and the subsequent three years (short run, SR) and one for the last 
(fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh) post-displacement years (long-medium run, LMR). Therefore the 
estimated equations will take the following form: 
 (2) ,    ∑∑ ∑
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The characteristics we analyze can be described as categorical variables (for example classes of 
firm size, males Vs females,...), so G is simply an indicator function for whether individual i is a 
member of group j.  
                                                 
19 I consider firm size the year preceding displacement because firm closures necessarily result in zero employees at the 
end of the year of displacement/closure. 
  19IV. Results 
 
Figure 3 plots the percentage annual real aggregate earnings losses deriving from the estimated 
coefficients of model (1) against the number of years before or after workers’ separations
20. 
Remember from the previous sections that we have defined the losses as the difference between the 
actual labor market outcomes of displaced workers and their outcomes had they not experienced a 
displacement
21. The second term of this difference represent the counterfactual situation of 
displacement that cannot be observed and that is substituted by the control group outcomes. 
As found in many other studies about U.S., also Italian data show that ultimately displaced 
workers and mass-layoffs separators experience earnings losses even before displacement and that 
the divergence of the actual earnings of these displaced workers from their expected levels 
accelerates as displacement get closer. Thus, even if the magnitude of these losses is modest 
(especially if compared to American studies), it seems that the events that lead to workers’ 
displacements negatively influence workers’ earnings. However, as advocated by our informal 
specification test described in the previous paragraph, the estimated losses are  generally small (and 
often not statistically different from 0) for time periods more than two years before separation. The 
highest losses are registered during the year of displacement and the subsequent year (around -20%) 
and they are followed by a recovering of earnings. This process of recovering stops approximately 
the third year after displacement and subsequently, during the fifth post-displacement year, it seems 
to get its strength back. However, seven years after displacement aggregate earnings of displaced 
workers still depart by about 10% from those of the control group
22. 
 We have just defined some common features of the estimated aggregate earnings losses that 
hold for all the groups of workers analyzed  but  only-mass-layoffs, pre-closing separators and other 
movers. If we look at the results for the latter group we can clearly see, even from the simple 
observation of the graph, that the pre-separation earnings of these workers don’t meaningfully differ 
much from those of workers that never left their 1985-firm. However, I don’t want to 
                                                 
20 Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the appendix reports coefficients, standard errors and p-values. 
21 When I consider the other movers group, the counterfactual situation is no mobility. 
22 The coefficients associated with the dummies indicating the seventh year after displacement are not always 
statistically significant (see Appendix); however they result highly significant in the estimates based  on a larger version 
of the sample  (1: 90 instead of 1: 180), whose results are forthcoming. 
  20overemphasize the estimation results for the other movers groups, cause mobility cannot be 
considered as an exogenous variable in an earnings-regression. Therefore, I will look at the 
estimation results for the other movers not to give them a causal interpretation, but simply to 
compare them with the results for other groups. Table A.1  shows that only in the year of mobility 
(0) and in the previous (-1)  and subsequent (+1) year the coefficients of the dummies  are 
negative and statistically significant, indicating aggregate earnings losses of, at maximum, 4%. 
Theses losses could be simply the result of the loss of some days of work during the transition from 
the old to the new job and/or they could be the result of the inclusion of some workers that have 
been laid-off on an individual basis. During the following years, other movers’ earnings tend to be 
equivalent to those of never displaced workers. The fact that the econometric model doesn’t detect 
relevant earnings losses for workers that are not displaced constitutes additional supporting 
evidence for our results concerning displaced workers
K δ
23. 
Let’s now compare the results concerning the different groups of displaced workers. In the pre-
displacement period ultimately displaced workers fare better than mass-layoffs and only mass-
layoffs:  the highest losses among these three groups are registered by the only-mass-layoffs group. 
Moreover, pre-separation coefficients for the only-mass-layoffs and mass-layoffs groups are already 
negative and statistically significant at, respectively, the fifth and the fourth pre-displacement years, 
whereas for ultimately displaced workers the corresponding critical point  is set  at the second pre-
displacement year. Two years before displacement the aggregate earnings of the ultimately 
displaced, mass-layoffs and only mass-layoffs groups respectively depart by about 4%, 5% and 
10% from those of the control group. During the subsequent year, i.e. the pre-displacement year, the 
only-mass-layoffs group looses (with respect the control group) about 15%, while the 
corresponding figures for the mass-layoffs and the ultimately displaced groups are respectively 8% 
and 6%. This evidence could be connected to the fact that during mass-layoffs that are not followed 
by the closure of the firm, employers can select “less useful/productive” workers to be laid-off, 
whereas, by definition, a firm closure determines the separation of all the workers, irrespective of 
their past histories (i.e., the selected layoffs hypothesis for only-mass-layoffs).    
                                                 
23 On this point J.Angrist and A.Krueger (1998) (page 56) wrote: “…non experimental research designs can be assessed 
by comparing pre-treatment trends for the treatment and comparison group (e.g., Ashenfelter and Card, 1985, and 
Heckman and Hotz, 1989) or by looking at effects where there should be none (e.g., Bound, 1989)”. 
  21On the other hand, the estimates for pre-closing separators clearly contrast with those for the 
three groups on which we have just focused. Workers that separate the year preceding the closure of 
their  firms  experience no statistically and economically significant aggregate earnings losses until 
the year preceding their mobility. During the year of separation and the previous year I estimate 














- 7 - 6 - 5 - 4 - 3 - 2 - 1 01234567
































ultimately displaced mass-layoffs only mass-layoffs
pre-closing separators 2 y. w. closure displ. other movers
      Figure 3. Estimated percentage aggregate earnings losses of displaced workers and other movers. 
 
The fact that pre-closing separators (pre-mobility) earnings are not statistically different from 
those of the control group and that the estimated coefficients are positives till the year preceding 
separation  seems to support the auto-selection hypothesis exposed in the previous paragraph. 
Moreover, during the separation and the previous year they loose less than the other displaced 
workers but more than the other movers group; during post separation years the estimated 
coefficients are not statistically different from zero and, besides, they have positive sign.  Naturally, 
it could also be that pre-closing separations are simply not related to the impending closure of the 
firm. Therefore, I will cautionary interpret the estimates concerning ultimately displaced workers as 
  22upper bound estimates of the effect of a plant closure on earnings and the estimates for 2 y.w.c.d.w.  
group as lower bound estimates. However, with respect both the magnitude and the statistical 
significance of the differences, the results for the two groups are rather similar. This is probably due 
to the fact that in this random sample of high-tenure workers the phenomenon of pre-closure 
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ultimately displaced mass-layoffs only mass-layoffs
pre-closing separators 2 y. w. closure displ. other movers
 Figure 4. Estimated percentage main-job earnings losses of displaced workers and other movers. 
 
Up till now I have not considered the results concerning the other dependent variable: main-job 
earnings (figure 4). In general, if we consider only the earnings deriving from the main job, the 
estimated  earnings losses of displaced workers (ultimately displaced, mass-layoffs, only mass-
layoffs and the 2 y.w.c.d.w. group)  tend to be bigger before and after displacement
25. This could be 
                                                 
24 Relaxing the restriction about employment flows concerning pre-closure separations doesn’t change the main results. 
 
25 Comparing main job and aggregate earnings losses during the year of mobility it is not very informative. The 
difference between them could be simply related to the timing of separation within the relevant year. 
  23due to the fact that displaced workers are relatively more inclined to have multiple jobs in order to 
integrate their main job earnings and/or because displaced workers are less attached to their new 
jobs. Estimated pre-separation losses in terms of aggregate earnings and main-job earnings are very 
similar from lag -7 to lag -4, but three years before displacement  the latter begin to be higher than 
the former. During the post-displacement period the losses in term of main-job earnings continue to 
be higher than losses in term of aggregate earnings, though this difference tend progressively to 
reduce.  
Figure 5 and figure 6 respectively reports the estimated percentage aww and aaww losses of 
displaced workers and other movers. Comparing the two figures, it is evident that the main 













- 7 - 6 - 5 - 4 - 3 - 2 - 1 01234567













ultimately displaced mass-layoffs only mass-layoffs
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 Figure 5. Estimated Percentage aww losses of displaced workers and other movers. 
 
As explained in section II, we have defined two different weekly wage variables to take into 
account the fact that, during the year of mobility, the earnings at the left job could be inflated by 
some of its components that are higher during the last year of employment in a particular firm: 
repayments for accumulated  vacations and back-payments due to law or contract. Moreover, given 
  24their characteristics, it is likely that the share of this kind of compensations in earnings is 
proportional to the tenure of the worker. If these hypotheses hold, using aww as dependent variable  
would imply an overestimation of the wage at the left firm (whose magnitude would be directly 
proportional to the tenure of the worker) and therefore an attenuation of the estimated consequences 
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 Figure 6. Estimated Percentage aaww losses of displaced workers and other movers. 
 
In fact, during the year of mobility, using aaww as dependent variable I estimate greater wage 
losses than using aww. However, if using aww I risk to underestimate the wage losses during the 
year of mobility, probably using aaww I overestimate them, cause I don’t consider the wage at the 
left firm that it is very likely, especially for displaced workers, to be higher than the wage at the 
new firm. Thus, the truth lies in the middle. Given that I have no other information to disentangle 
the percentage of the earnings due to the compensation components outlined above (during the year 
  25of displacement at the left job), this is the only feasible strategy. However, fortunately, the 
estimated wage losses for the other periods are quantitatively very similar. 
As for earnings, estimated wage losses of ultimately displaced workers, mass-layoffs and the 2 
y.w.c.d.w. are similar.  I estimate wage losses even before displacement and the divergence of the 
actual wages of these displaced workers from their expected levels accelerates as displacement get 
closer. Another important general finding is that wages begin to decline before aggregate earnings: 
it seems that firms adjust to the negative economic events that lead to workers’ displacements firstly 
by trying to save on workers’ wages. 
However, as advocated by our informal specification test described in the previous paragraph, 
the estimated wage losses of ultimately-displaced and 2 y.w.c.d. workers group are  generally small 
(and often not statistically different from 0) for time periods more than four years before separation. 
The mass-layoff sample is instead characterized by a more persistent pattern of pre-displacement 
wage losses: the estimated coefficients are negative and statistically significant for all the pre-
separation years. Looking at the estimated wage losses of the only mass-layoffs group, this pre-
displacement dynamics is even more evident. This finding reinforce the credibility of the selected 
layoffs hypothesis for the group of only-mass-layoffs.  Post-displacement wages losses of displaced 
workers follow an irregular path that is characterized by the absence of signals pointing at a 
recovery of wages: seven year after displacement I still estimate wage losses of about 10%. 
However, also with respect post-displacement outcomes, the mass-layoff group (and the only mass-
layoffs group) appear to be worse-off with respect ultimately displaced and  2 y.w.c.d.  workers. 
This evidence is another time consistent with the selected-layoffs hypothesis: during mass-layoffs 
not connected to firm closures employers lay off the “less useful/productive” workers (whose 
performance was poor in the years before separation) and, after displacement, estimated wage 
losses of these workers tend to be higher than those of workers displaced due to firm closure. 
On the other hand, the estimates for pre-closing separators clearly contrast with those for the 
three groups on which we have just focused. Workers that separate the year preceding the closure of 
their  firms  never experience statistically significant wage losses.  During the year preceding 
separations I estimate wage losses of about 3% (thought the coefficient is not statistically 
significant). The fact that pre-closing separators pre-mobility wages are not statistically different 
from those of the control group and that the estimated coefficients are positives till the year 
  26preceding separation seems, another time, to support the auto-selection hypothesis. Moreover, 
during post separation years the estimated coefficients are not statistically different from zero and, 
with few exceptions, they have positive sign.  As for earnings, I will cautionary interpret the 
estimates concerning ultimately displaced workers as upper bound estimates of the effect of a plant 
closure on wages and the estimates for 2 y.w.c.d.w. group as lower bound estimates. However, also 
in this case, with respect both the magnitude and the statistical significance of the differences, the 
results for the two groups are rather similar. 
Other movers wage-losses are modest and concentrated in the years immediately following 
mobility. As for earnings, the fact that the econometric model doesn’t detect relevant wage losses 
for workers that are not displaced constitutes additional supporting evidence for our results 
concerning displaced workers. 
Let’s now concentrate on the consequences of displacement in terms of employment. Figures 7 
and 8 describe the estimated losses with respect worked weeks considering as dependent variable, 
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 Figure 8. Estimated percentage main-job worked weeks  losses of displaced workers and other movers. 
 
As for earnings and wages, the estimated losses of ultimately displaced workers, mass-layoffs 
and 2 y.w.c.d. workers are very similar.  An economically and statistically meaningful divergence of 
the actual worked weeks of these displaced workers from their expected levels begins, considering 
main-job worked weeks, two years before displacement and, considering aggregate worked weeks, 
only the year before displacement. Aggregate worked weeks reduction due to displacement reaches 
its peak around the year of displacement, with losses of more than 15%. During the post-
displacement periods the losses tend progressively to reduce: seven years after displacement 
estimated losses are highly insignificant, both statistically and economically. Therefore, it appears 
that long term earnings losses in this sample of high tenure displaced workers are mainly due to 
persistent wage reductions and not to losses in terms of worked weeks
26. This finding is in line with 
the results of the international empirical literature on the consequences of displacement (Ruhm, 
1991; Fallick, 1996).  
                                                 
26 The sample selection strategy of excluding workers that don’t have earnings in private dependent sector in a given 
year could be probably  the key determinant of this result. See appendix A.5. 
  28Also with respect to employment, the estimates for pre-closing separators clearly diverge from 
those for the three groups we have just described. Workers that separate the year preceding the 
closure of their  firms  never experience statistically significant losses in terms of worked weeks. 
Only during the year of mobility I estimate economically relevant worked weeks losses, of only 
about 4%.  Moreover, it appears that in the post separation period, especially in terms of the main-
job dependent variable, pre-closing separators work more than the control group. Another time, for 
this group the auto-selection hypothesis seems more credible than the selected layoffs hypothesis.  
The estimated losses for the only-mass-layoffs group are very similar to those for ultimately 
displaced workers, especially during the pre-displacement period and the year of displacement. 
Therefore, these two groups differ more in term of wages than in terms of worked weeks. Figure 7 
and 8 also show that during the year following displacement  the only-mass-layoffs’ losses in term 
of aggregate worked weeks are considerably higher than those for ultimately displaced workers. 
The estimated losses in term of aggregate worked weeks reach a peak during the first post-
displacement year, not during the year of mobility (as it happens for all the other groups). Instead, 
we don’t detect such phenomenon if we look at main-job worked weeks: it seems that the 
comparatively worse short run employment consequences of displacement for only mass-layoffs 
workers are especially due to the fact that they are less likely to hold multiple jobs and, therefore, to 
integrate their main-job earnings. Indeed, looking back at figures 3 and 4,  we can notice that,  if 
earnings losses in terms of the main-job dependent variable reach a peak during the year of 
displacement, aggregate earnings losses reach a peak during the post-displacement year. 
Other movers employment-losses are modest and concentrated in the years around mobility.  As 
for earnings and wages, the fact that the econometric model doesn’t detect relevant losses for 
workers that are not displaced constitutes additional supporting evidence for our results concerning 
displaced workers. 
 
Let’s now look at the effects of displacement from the point of view of the characteristics of the 
displaced workers and their post displacement mobility outcomes. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 reports the 
estimated coefficients of model (2) for ultimately displaced workers. I decompose earnings, wage 
  29and employment reductions following or preceding displacement with respect the characteristics of 
workers at the left job
27 and their post-displacement mobility outcomes.  
The baseline worker we consider is a less than 30 years old woman, who works in a firm with 
more than 18 employees in the manufacturing sector as a white-collar. She works in a local labor 
market whose unemployment rate (during the year of displacement) is lower than the Italian 
average and, after displacement, she doesn’t change sector or type of occupation. This kind of 
worker doesn’t experience losses due to displacement: she is in a better situation, both before and 
after displacement, with respect the other non-displaced workers. She has higher aggregate earnings 
and wages; however, she has a comparatively higher tendency to change job and/or to hold multiple 
jobs in a give year. 
The most important determinant of workers’ losses is age. Workers that at the time of 
displacement were between 30 and 40 years old have very high pre and post displacement earnings 
losses (with respect younger workers), both with respect aggregate and main-job earnings. 
However, such earnings losses  appear, especially in the long run, to be the consequence of wage 
reductions more than of reductions in worked weeks. Also more than 40 years old workers are 
particularly hit by displacement, even if comparatively less than workers who were between 30 and 
40 years old at the moment of displacement. Therefore it seems that the effect of age on the 
consequences of displacement is decreasing. Moreover the losses of older workers appear to be 
determined even more by wage reductions than by worked weeks reductions. The importance of age 
as a determinant of wage reductions due to displacement is a finding that is robust and uniform 
across countries
28. Therefore the age structure of a national labor market has important 
consequences on its capabilities to adapt to change.  
Blue collar workers are hit comparatively more than white collars by displacement.  In this case, 
however, the impact of the type of occupation on the consequences of displacement seems to act 
                                                 
27 Results for the 2 y.w.c.  displaced workers are equivalent and are not reported. Given the observations of above (i.e. 
the possible endogeneity of the mass layoffs dummies, that is related to the selected layoffs hypothesis), I don’t estimate 
model (2) for mass-layoffs and only mass layoffs. 
 
28 See Kuhn et al. (2002) 
 
  30more through a reduced employability than through wage cuts. Another time, the international 
literature on displaced workers conforms with the described Italian patterns
29.  
   Aggregate real earnings  Main job real earnings  aww  aaww 
   Pre SR  LMR  Pre SR  LMR  Pre SR  LMR  Pre SR  LMR 
All workers  .186** .279*** .249**  .202** -.559*** .137* .078*** .144*** .137* .098*** -0.103 -0.094 
SE  0.078 0.096 0.118  0.08  0.151 0.076 0.023  0.045 0.076 0.028 0.135 0.177 
P-value  0.018 0.004 0.034 0.012 0.000 0.072 0.001  0.001 0.072 0.000 0.444 0.595 
CIG  -0.086 -.191* -.226* -.094* -0.128 -.099* -0.048 -.121*** -.099*  -.052*  0.011  0.05 
SE  0.056 0.108 0.121 0.057 0.155 0.056 0.031  0.042 0.056 0.031 0.105 0.159 
P-value  0.124 0.077 0.061 0.098 0.409 0.077  0.12  0.004 0.077 0.097 0.914 0.755 
Age =>30 & <40  -.211*** -.316*** -.268**  -.210***  -.294**  -.163** -.080*** -.138*** -.163** -.081*** -.261** -.369** 
SE  0.072 0.086 0.106 0.072 0.125 0.067  0.02  0.037 0.067 0.02 0.109  0.144 
P-value  0.003 0.000 0.012 0.004 0.018 0.015 0.000  0.000 0.015 0.000 0.017 0.011 
Age >= 40  -.180** -.234*** -.211**  -.183**  -0.186 -.142** -.070*** -.094** -.142** -.075*** -.229** -.338** 
SE  0.072 0.087 0.104 0.072 0.126 0.066 0.018  0.038 0.066 0.02 0.109  0.143 
P-value  0.012 0.007 0.043 0.011 0.141 0.031 0.000  0.013 0.031 0.000 0.035 0.018 
Small firm  0.008 -0.008 -0.015 -0.003 -0.037 -0.027 -0.004  0.009 -0.027 -0.012 -0.034 -0.041 
SE  0.022 0.048 0.054 0.023 0.076 0.036  0.01  0.026 0.036 0.011 0.072 0.085 
P-value  0.731 0.859 0.786 0.897  0.63 0.455 0.66  0.723  0.455 0.273 0.638 0.629 
Services  0.008 0.051 0.037 -0.007 0.131 0.001 0.002 -0.018 0.001 -0.012 0.012 0.032 
SE  0.021 0.045 0.055 0.025 0.085 0.039  0.01  0.03  0.039 0.017 0.083 0.088 
P-value  0.693 0.262  0.5  0.781 0.124 0.971 0.886  0.554 0.971 0.471 0.881 0.715 
Blue collars  -.052** -.165***  -.170*** -.060**  -0.115  -0.062 -0.018 -.070** -0.062 -.031** -0.108 -0.119 
SE  0.023 0.044  0.05  0.025 0.082 0.039 0.011  0.033 0.039 0.015 0.081 0.085 
P-value  0.021 0 0.001  0.016  0.161 0.117 0.104  0.034 0.117 0.047 0.184 0.161 
Men  0.026 0.039 0.046 0.024 0.054 .095** 0.009  0.051 .095** 0.007  0.032 0.119 
SE  0.025 0.047 0.057 0.026 0.075 0.044 0.012  0.034 0.044 0.013 0.075 0.086 
P-value  0.301 0.402 0.415 0.357 0.471 0.032 0.454  0.13  0.032 0.593 0.669 0.167 
Local Unempl. rate  0.008 -.132* -.137* 0.021 -0.057 0.000 -0.001  0.037 0.000 0.005  0.01 0.033 
SE  0.02 0.068  0.072  0.022 0.091 0.048 0.013  0.041 0.048 0.016 0.088 0.100 
P-value  0.708 0.051 0.056 0.344 0.527 0.997 0.955  0.369 0.997 0.751 0.912 0.745 
Change occupation  0.031 0.011 0.199 0.035 0.069 0.124 -.027*  0.011 0.124 -0.023 -0.117  -0.035 
SE  0.054 0.127 0.173 0.054 0.168 0.11 0.016 0.051 0.11 0.017 0.147  0.182 
P-value  0.569 0.929 0.251 0.523 0.682 0.261 0.092  0.82  0.261 0.167 0.427 0.849 
Change sector  -.045* -.281***  -.259*** -0.042  .168**  0.010  -.019* 0.001 0.01 -0.017  .386***  .481*** 
SE  0.024 0.068 0.083 0.026 0.085 0.048 0.011  0.025 0.048 0.013 0.061 0.085 
P-value  0.059 0.000 0.002 0.108 0.049 0.829 0.088  0.964 0.829 0.201 0.000 0.000 
Table 2.1 Notes: Standard errors are robust to residuals that are not identically distributed and to observations that are independent 
 across groups (individuals) but not necessarily independent within groups.  
 
                                                 
29 See Kuhn et al. (2002) 
 
  31   Aggregate worked weeks  Main job worked weeks 
   Pre SR LMR  Pre SR LMR 
All workers  0.107 0.133  0.109  .130*  -.675*** -.619*** 
SE  0.073 0.095  0.112 0.076 0.165  0.214 
P-value  0.139 0.164  0.328 0.087 0.000  0.004 
CIG  -0.038 -0.069  -0.126 -0.048 0.003  -0.075 
SE  0.034 0.094  0.102 0.035 0.143  0.181 
P-value  0.256 0.461  0.216 0.171 0.982  0.678 
Age =>30 & <40  -.131*  -.176** -0.103 -.129* -0.188 -0.276 
SE  0.067 0.088  0.102 0.068 0.130  0.171 
P-value  0.051 0.044  0.311 0.056 0.148  0.106 
Age > 40  -0.111 -0.139  -0.067  -.116* -0.156 -0.202 
SE  0.069 0.089  0.102  0.07 0.133 0.172 
P-value  0.107 0.119  0.513 0.096 0.241  0.241 
Small firm  0.012 -0.018  0.012 -0.001 -0.069  -0.055 
SE  0.019 0.049  0.053 0.021 0.079  0.099 
P-value  0.534 0.717  0.821 0.977 0.379  0.578 
Services  0.007 0.07  0.036  -0.014 0.123  0.113 
SE  0.017 0.048  0.054 0.025 0.094  0.104 
P-value  0.694 0.145  0.508 0.562 0.191  0.277 
Blue collars  -.034* -.095**  -.107** -.047** -0.035  -0.093 
SE  0.019 0.048  0.054 0.023 0.091  0.100 
P-value  0.074 0.048  0.046 0.044 0.702  0.351 
Men  0.018 -0.012  -0.048 0.015 0.009  0.033 
SE  0.022 0.054  0.06  0.023 0.083  0.099 
P-value  0.42 0.825 0.417 0.513 0.913  0.738 
Local Unempl rate  0.008 -.169**  -.138*  0.025 -0.052  0.049 
SE  0.015 0.077  0.08  0.019 0.099  0.112 
P-value  0.58 0.028 0.086 0.198 0.599  0.663 
Change occupation  0.058 0.000  0.075 0.062 -0.048 -0.009 
SE  0.056 0.113  0.199 0.056 0.200  0.253 
P-value  0.306 1.00  0.705 0.264 0.811  0.972 
Change sector  -0.026 -.282*** -.269*** -0.021 .231*** .342*** 
SE  0.018 0.067  0.075 0.021 0.088  0.106 
P-value  0.161 0.000  0.000 0.332 0.009  0.001 
Table 2.2 Notes: Standard errors are robust to residuals that are not identically 
distributed and to observations that are independent across groups (individuals) but 
                                                   not necessarily independent within groups. 
Another important determinants of the heterogeneity of the consequences of displacement are the 
macroeconomic conditions at the time of displacement. Workers that were displaced in local labor 
markets with an unemployment rate above the Italian average display higher post displacement 
earnings losses. Bad macro-conditions affect only the employability prospects of  displaced 
  32workers, not their future wages. The dummies indicating small firms and services employment and 
sex turned out, instead, to be insignificant.  
Let’s now look at the consequences of post displacement mobility on the heterogeneity of the 
effects of displacement. The losses of the workers that change type of occupation in the post 
displacement period are not different from the losses of  the other comparable displaced workers
30. 
However, displaced workers that change their sector of employment have higher losses than 
workers that don’t change. This finding could be related, as many studies on displaced workers 
argue, to the loss of sectoral-specific (or firm-specific) human capital (or to the loss of union 
coverage). However, it appears that the higher earnings losses of Italian displaced workers that 
change sector should be imputed not to wage losses but to a lower post displacement employability. 
Moreover, comparing losses in term of aggregate worked weeks with those in term of main-job 
worked weeks, we can deduce that such losses are correlated to worse capabilities of holding 
multiple jobs and/or of changing job: the coefficients for the aggregate variable are negative (and 
highly significant), instead the coefficients for the main job variable are positive (and highly 
significant).  
To take into account this Italian labor market institution, I have also introduced a dummy that 
signals if a particular worker was subject to the “Cassa Integrazione” (CIG or CIGS)
31 during the 
year of displacement at the left firm. The “Cassa Integrazione” is a subsidy that is granted to 
manufacturing workers employed in firms in bad economic situations, that guarantees a wage 
replacement rate of 80%. Results are somehow surprising. I find that these kind of workers 
experience higher losses both in the short run and in the long-medium run. Both kind of earnings 
losses seems to be related more to wage losses than to reduced employment prospects. Two possible 
explanations for this result are available: or “Cassa Integrazione” has a negative effect on displaced 
workers future wages or being subject to “Cassa Integrazione” is correlated to some factor I don’t 
account for
32.   
 
 
                                                 
30 A very low share of displaced workers (3%) change type of occupation. 
31 See appendix, section A.4. 
32 The estimated coefficients of the other variables indicating workers’ characteristics don’t appreciably change 
introducing or not the dummy indicating CIG. 
  33V. Conclusions 
 
The main conclusions of this empirical investigation on the consequences of displacement on 
high tenure Italian workers are the following. 
- The descriptive statistics showed that, for high tenure Italian workers, job displacement is more 
common among women, unskilled workers and younger workers. Moreover, it appears that workers 
belonging to the control group, other movers and pre-closing separators differ from workers 
belonging to the other groups of displaced workers more in terms of wages than in terms of  worked 
weeks. 
- Other two important points emerged from the preliminary descriptive statistics. Firstly, the 
labor market characteristics (that we have observed in table 1, figure 1 and figure 2)  of  pre-closing 
separators are very different from those of  ultimately displaced workers: the pre-closing separators 
group is relatively more skilled  and have relatively greater percentages of men, of manufacturing 
workers and of older workers. Moreover, with respect to wage and earnings dynamics, pre-closing 
separators are relatively better-off. Secondly, workers displaced due to firm closure appear to be 
different from workers displaced during a mass-layoff not connected to a firm closure. The only-
mass-layoffs group is comparatively less skilled and have greater percentages of men, of 
manufacturing workers and of older workers. Moreover, with respect to wage and earnings 
dynamics, only-mass-layoffs separators are relatively worse-off. 
- Ultimately displaced workers and mass-layoffs separators experience earnings, wage and 
employment losses even before displacement and the divergence of the actual earnings of these 
displaced workers from their expected levels accelerates as displacement get closer. The highest 
earnings losses are registered during the year of displacement and the subsequent year (around         
-20%) and they are followed by a recovering of earnings. However, seven years after displacement 
aggregate earnings of displaced workers still depart by about 10% from those of the control group. 
Post-displacement wages losses of displaced workers follow an irregular path that is characterized 
by the absence of signals pointing at a recovery of wages: seven year after displacement I still 
estimate wage losses of about 10%. Aggregate worked weeks reduction due to displacement reaches 
its peak around the year of displacement, with losses of more than 15%. During the post-
  34displacement periods the losses tend progressively to reduce: seven years after displacement 
estimated losses are highly insignificant, both statistically and economically.  
- On the other hand, the estimates for pre-closing separators clearly contrast with those for the 
two groups on which we have just focused. Workers that separate the year preceding the closure of 
their  firms  experience no statistically and/or economically significant earnings, wage and 
employment losses, with the exception of the year of mobility and of the preceding year. To take 
into account this fact (the so called “auto-selection hypothesis”), I have build another group of 
displaced workers that is formed by ultimately displaced workers and pre-closing separators (the 2 
y.w.c.d.w. group). However, probably due to low number of pre-closing separators that are present 
in this sample, estimates for ultimately displaced workers and this new composite group are 
practically equivalent. 
- The estimates for the groups of mass-layoffs and only mass-layoffs showed a great persistency 
of  pre-displacement wage losses that supported the so called “selected layoffs” hypothesis. 
Therefore the estimated losses of these two groups could overestimate the consequences of 
displacement. Such degree of persistency is not found for ultimately displaced workers and the 2 
y.w.c.d.w. group. 
- The fact that the econometric model doesn’t detect relevant losses for workers that are not 
displaced constitutes additional supporting evidence for our results concerning ultimately displaced 
workers and the 2 y.w.c.d.w. group. 
-  The effects of displacement depend on the characteristics of displaced workers and their post 
displacement mobility outcomes. Older workers loose more; more in term of wages than of worked 
weeks. However, the effect of age on the consequences of displacement is decreasing.      Blue 
collar workers are hit comparatively more than white collars by displacement. In this case, 
conversely, the impact of the type of occupation on the consequences of displacement seems to act 
more through a reduced employability  than through wage cuts.     Workers that were displaced in 
local labor markets with an unemployment rate above the Italian average display higher post 
displacement earnings losses. Bad macro-conditions affect only the employability prospects of   
displaced workers, not their future w a g e s .     T h e  l o s s e s  o f  t h e workers that change type of 
occupation in the post displacement period are not different from the losses of  the other comparable 
displaced workers. However, displaced workers that change their sector of employment have higher 
  35losses than workers that don’t change. This finding could be related, as many studies on displaced 
workers argue, to the loss of sectoral-specific (or firm-specific) human capital. However, it appears 
that the higher earnings losses of Italian displaced workers that change sector should be imputed not 
to wage losses but to a lower post displacement employability. Moreover, comparing losses in term 
of aggregate worked weeks with those in term of main-job worked weeks, we can deduce that such 





A.1) General Sample Restrictions  
I consider only workers that in 1991 have seven or more years of tenure with their current firm. 
Workers of the construction sector are excluded due to the high seasonality of their jobs. Therefore, 
I will keep out from the samples workers that experienced displacement or mobility before or 
during year 1991. These are the basic sample restrictions that apply to all the groups and that have 
already mentioned in the paper.  
A.2) Firm Deaths  
False firm death is a practical problem that arises in administrative-data-based studies of 
displacement. I have dealt with this kind of problem trying to individuate spurious information 
about firms’ demography. Using the whole INPS (1:180) sample, I have individuated spurious firm 
deaths by controlling the post-displacement firms of, supposedly, displaced workers. In general, in 
order for a firm X to be the economic descendant of firm Y and/or firm Z, some share of workers 
leaving firm Y and/or firm Z must flow into firm X. Given that I have no information about all the 
workers employed in a given firm, I have adopted the following strategy: if two (statistically 
equivalent to 360 workers) or more workers happens to be employed in the same post-displacement 
firm I consider such closure(s) as a false firm death(s), i.e. merges and/or legal transformations.  
 Moreover, there are cases of mobility from firms that show zero employees at the end of the 
year but which, according to INPS data, didn’t close during such year.  Given that the firm 
employees variable is considered reliable (and much more reliable than the year of closure variable) 
  36and that omissions/delays in dating the firm death are possible in the INPS panel, we have chosen to 
consider a worker displaced due to plant closure also if at the end of the year of mobility his past 
firm resulted without employees. To avoid considering as closed firms (at least temporarily) firms 
that routinely display zero employees at the end of the year (for example because of the 
characteristics of their activities or simply because of fiscal advantages), we have additionally 
controlled that these firms didn’t display zero employees at the end of the previous (at least 7) 
years.  As a consequence, I categorize as displacement due to firm-closure all the cases of worker 
mobility accompanied by a registered closure of the firm and all the cases of mobility associated 
with absence of workforce at the end of the reference year in the reference firm (always conditional 





















  37A.3) Estimates 
Groups  Ultimately 
displaced  Mass-layoffs Only  mass-layoffs  Pre-closing 
separators 
2 y. W. closing 
displ.  Other movers 
Annual 
earnings  aggregate  main 
job  aggregate  main 
job  aggregate main 
job  aggregate main  job aggregate main 
job  aggregate  main 
job 
-7  0.007 0.007 0.004 0.005 -0.005  -0.003 0.084  0.083  0.011 0.011 .013** .014** 
se  0.015 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.027 0.027 0.070  0.070 0.015 0.015 0.005 0.005 
p  0.629 0.633 0.746 0.719 0.853 0.926 0.234  0.237  0.431 0.435 0.011 0.012 
-6  -0.002 -0.003 -0.010 -0.010 -0.036 -0.037  0.060  0.063  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 
se  0.016 0.017 0.014 0.015 0.030 0.030 0.074  0.073 0.016 0.016 0.006 0.006 
p  0.890 0.864 0.491 0.480 0.231 0.229 0.421  0.388  0.950 0.967 0.810 0.596 
-5  -0.024 -0.026 -.030** -.032** -0.051 -0.054 0.000  -0.020 -0.024  -0.027 -0.002 -0.003 
se  0.018 0.018 0.015 0.016 0.031 0.035 0.090  0.093 0.017 0.018 0.006 0.007 
p  0.170 0.155 0.050 0.048 0.103 0.127 0.998  0.827  0.177 0.141 0.814 0.697 
-4  -0.024  -0.025 -.037** -.039** -.080** -.091** 0.061  0.065 -0.019 -0.019 0.005  0.008 
se  0.019 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.039 0.042 0.077  0.076 0.018 0.018 0.007 0.007 
p  0.191 0.189 0.031 0.024 0.041 0.031 0.425  0.392  0.285 0.289 0.433 0.261 
-3 -0.020  -.038*  -.031*  -.048*** -.066** -.082**  0.027  0.038  -0.018 -.034* -0.003 -0.002 
se  0.018 0.020 0.016 0.018 0.033 0.038 0.084  0.083 0.018 0.019 0.007 0.007 
p  0.253 0.056 0.054 0.007 0.048 0.030 0.749  0.644  0.300 0.080 0.690 0.775 
-2  -.039** -.051** -.051*** -.060*** -.096*** -.090** -0.002  -0.017 -.037**  -.050** -0.001 -0.006 
se  0.018 0.020 0.016 0.018 0.037 0.038 0.089  0.100 0.018 0.020 0.007 0.008 
p  0.034 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.009 0.016 0.986  0.869  0.039 0.012 0.923 0.475 
-1  -.060*** -.076*** -.079*** -.098*** -.147*** -.176*** -0.050  -0.040  -.060*** -.075*** -.022*** -.028***
se  0.019 0.020 0.018 0.019 0.044 0.049 0.101  0.100 0.019 0.020 0.008 0.009 
p  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.618  0.692  0.001 0.000 0.005 0.001 
0  -.178*** -.822*** -.192*** -.730*** -.241*** -.391*** -0.067  -0.183  -.171*** -.777*** -.027*** -.282***
se  0.028 0.038 0.024 0.032 0.045 0.047 0.096  0.129 0.027 0.037 0.009 0.015 
p  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.483  0.154  0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
1  -.184*** -.219*** -.220*** -.250*** -.350*** -.362*** 0.017  0.012  -.170*** -.203*** -.038*** -.050***
se  0.027 0.029 0.025 0.027 0.061 0.061 0.086  0.090 0.026 0.028 0.010 0.011 
p  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.840  0.891  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2  -.145*** -.197*** -.158*** -.219*** -.211*** -.304*** 0.034  -0.008  -.133*** -.184***  -0.017  -.046***
se  0.029 0.032 0.026 0.029 0.053 0.064 0.094  0.110 0.028 0.031 0.011 0.012 
p  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.716  0.945  0.000 0.000 0.122 0.000 
3  -.117*** -.144*** -.142*** -.175*** -.232*** -.287*** 0.034  0.052  -.108*** -.131***  -0.003  -.023* 
se  0.029 0.034 0.026 0.031 0.052 0.070 0.095  0.095 0.028 0.032 0.012 0.013 
p  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.719  0.588  0.000 0.000 0.819 0.083 
4  -.114*** -.141*** -.142*** -.173*** -.246*** -.291*** -0.005  0.006  -.110*** -.133***  -0.001  -0.003 
se  0.030 0.035 0.027 0.032 0.060 0.071 0.117  0.118 0.030 0.034 0.014 0.016 
p  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.968  0.957  0.000 0.000 0.930 0.843 
5  -.141*** -.141*** -.164*** -.173*** -.249*** -.287*** 0.058  0.090 -.131***  -.128*** 0.014  0.025 
se  0.043 0.045 0.036 0.039 0.066 0.078 0.113  0.113 0.040 0.042 0.016 0.018 
p  0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.608  0.426  0.001 0.002 0.391 0.184 
6  -.118*** -.130*** -.147*** -.158*** -.258*** -.258*** 0.052  0.041 -.110***  -.122*** 0.006  0.017 
se  0.041 0.045 0.036 0.040 0.070 0.080 0.121  0.143 0.038 0.043 0.019 0.022 
p  0.004 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.667  0.773  0.004 0.004 0.757 0.449 
7 -0.097  -.138*  -.116*  -.151**  -.170**  -.163* 0.103  0.145 -0.086 -.117* 0.008  0.046 
se  0.069 0.074 0.060 0.065 0.075 0.084 0.092  0.094 0.062 0.067 0.026 0.030 
p  0.162 0.063 0.054 0.020 0.023 0.054 0.263  0.124  0.171 0.080 0.756 0.122 
Prob.>F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observ.  130816 130816 133098 133098 124754 124754 123116  123116  131460 131460 125930 125930
Workers  9344 9344 9507 9507 8911 8911 8794  8794  9390 9390 8995 8995 
 Table A.1. Notes: Standard errors are robust to residuals that are not identically distributed and to observations that are independent across   
groups (individuals) but not necessarily independent within groups. 
 
  38Groups  Ultimately 
displaced  Mass-layoffs Only  mass-layoffs Pre-closing 
separators 
2 y. W. closing 
displ.  Other movers 
Weekly 
Wages  aww aaww aww aaww aww aaww  aww  aaww  aww aaww aww aaww 
-7  -0.009 -0.009 -.010* -.011** -0.012 -.017* .029*** .029*** -0.007  -0.007 .015*** .017*** 
se  0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.011  0.011 0.006  0.006 0.003 0.003 
p  0.138 0.136 0.058 0.034 0.172 0.058  0.006  0.006  0.239 0.232 0.000 0.000 
-6  -.013*  -.014*  -.019*** -.021*** -.041*** -.045*** .029**  .032**  -0.011 -0.012 .006*  .007* 
se  0.007 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.014 0.013 0.014  0.015 0.007  0.008 0.003 0.003 
p  0.069 0.075 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001  0.040  0.031  0.121 0.125 0.055 0.054 
-5 -.017*  -0.016  -.022***  -.024***  -.041*** -.049***  0.025  0.011  -0.015 -0.015 0.001  0.003 
se  0.010 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.013 0.015 0.018  0.025 0.009  0.010 0.003 0.004 
p  0.081 0.111 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.001  0.175  0.665  0.113 0.126 0.695 0.435 
-4 -.019**  -.017*  -.030***  -.032***  -.068***  -.086*** 0.022  0.025  -.017* -0.015 .007*  .010** 
se  0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.019 0.023 0.019  0.019 0.009  0.009 0.004 0.004 
p  0.044 0.086 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000  0.246  0.193  0.063 0.120 0.094 0.029 
-3  -.023** -.040*** -.029*** -.049*** -.051*** -.080***  0.019  0.026  -.021** -.036***  0.004  0.006 
se  0.010 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.019 0.026 0.024  0.023 0.009  0.012 0.004 0.004 
p  0.014 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.002  0.424  0.262  0.022 0.002 0.324 0.180 
-2 -0.018  -.029**  -.032***  -.040*** -.080*** -.082***  -0.005  -0.014 -0.018  -.028**  0.003 0.002 
se  0.012 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.018 0.018 0.028  0.031 0.011  0.012 0.004 0.005 
p  0.117 0.028 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.861  0.664  0.108 0.023 0.469 0.646 
-1  -.025*  -.039** -.040*** -.060*** -.095*** -.133*** -0.037  -0.030 -.027**  -.039*** -0.003  -0.004 
se  0.014 0.016 0.012 0.014 0.020 0.027 0.045  0.045 0.013  0.015 0.005 0.006 
p  0.062 0.012 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.413  0.506  0.041 0.009 0.615 0.455 
0 0.006  -.335***  -0.006  -.283***  -.051**  -.088*** -0.029  -0.041  0.003 -.315***  .013**  -.154*** 
se  0.015 0.033 0.012 0.027 0.023 0.026 0.030  0.044 0.014  0.031 0.005 0.011 
p  0.682 0.000 0.609 0.000 0.025 0.001  0.335  0.346  0.829 0.000 0.011 0.000 
1  -.049*** -.070*** -.067*** -.084*** -.136*** -.138***  0.000  0.011  -.046*** -.064***  -0.006  -.011* 
se  0.014 0.018 0.012 0.015 0.024 0.025 0.028  0.028 0.013  0.017 0.006 0.007 
p  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.989  0.710  0.001 0.000 0.308 0.094 
2  -.065*** -.095*** -.076*** -.112*** -.119*** -.174***  0.002  -0.042  -.061*** -.092***  -0.006  -.028*** 
se  0.020 0.023 0.017 0.020 0.025 0.035 0.030  0.060 0.019  0.022 0.006 0.008 
p  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.956  0.486  0.001 0.000 0.342 0.001 
3  -.052*** -.069*** -.072*** -.096*** -.144*** -.187***  0.005  0.016 -.048***  -.063***  0.001 -.015* 
se  0.020 0.023 0.017 0.020 0.028 0.034 0.032  0.032 0.018  0.021 0.007 0.009 
p  0.009 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.881  0.618  0.009 0.003 0.924 0.092 
4  -.070*** -.073*** -.080*** -.086*** -.113*** -.126***  -0.015  0.006 -.067***  -.068***  0.010 0.005 
se  0.022 0.025 0.019 0.022 0.035 0.045 0.041  0.042 0.020  0.023 0.008 0.011 
p  0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005  0.705  0.892  0.001 0.003 0.215 0.649 
5 -.088***  -.076**  -.100***  -.097*** -.141*** -.167***  0.021  0.023 -.082***  -.070** 0.013 0.017 
se  0.030 0.032 0.025 0.027 0.033 0.044 0.054  0.054 0.029  0.030 0.009 0.012 
p  0.004 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.693  0.666  0.004 0.021 0.184 0.143 
6  -.063**  -.070** -.078*** -.085*** -.134*** -.132*** -0.013  -0.038 -.061** -.069** -0.002 -0.003 
se  0.029 0.033 0.024 0.027 0.030 0.040 0.050  0.056 0.027  0.030 0.012 0.016 
p  0.031 0.032 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001  0.795  0.502  0.023 0.023 0.885 0.824 
7 -0.095  -0.098  -.102**  -.105*  -.108***  -.102** -0.020  -0.012  -.090* -0.091 -0.005 0.024 
se  0.061 0.066 0.052 0.057 0.034 0.044 0.055  0.053 0.054  0.059 0.015 0.020 
p  0.116 0.142 0.049 0.066 0.001 0.019  0.711  0.825  0.093 0.124 0.756 0.219 
Prob.>F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observ.  130816 130816 133098 133098 124754 124754  123116  123116  131460 131460 125930 125930 
Workers  9344 9344 9507 9507 8911 8911  8794  8794  9390 9390 8995 8995 
Table A.2 Notes: Standard errors are robust to residuals that are not identically distributed and to observations that are independent across 
groups (individuals) but not necessarily independent within groups. 
 
  39Groups  Ultimately displaced  Mass-layoffs  Only mass-layoffs  Pre-closing 
separators  2 y. W. closing displ.  Other movers 
Worked 
weeks  aggregate  main job  aggregate  main job  aggregate  main job  aggregate  main job  aggregate  main job  aggregate  main job 
-7  0.016 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.007 0.008 0.054 0.054 0.018 0.019 -0.002 0.000 
se  0.014 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.028 0.028 0.071 0.071 0.014 0.014 0.005 0.005 
p  0.243 0.236 0.266 0.249 0.812 0.772 0.443 0.449 0.181 0.176 0.708 0.930 
-6  0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.030 0.035 0.012 0.011 -0.004  -0.002 
se  0.014 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.026 0.026 0.074 0.073 0.014 0.015 0.005 0.006 
p  0.446 0.505 0.460 0.521 0.851 0.890 0.682 0.635 0.409 0.450 0.428 0.715 
-5  -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 -0.011 -0.015 -0.025 -0.045 -0.009 -0.012 -0.003 -0.004 
se  0.017 0.018 0.014 0.015 0.027 0.032 0.092 0.095 0.017 0.017 0.006 0.006 
p  0.676 0.626 0.577 0.509 0.699 0.641 0.789 0.637 0.595 0.503 0.610 0.502 
-4  -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.010 -0.012 -0.026 0.039 0.044 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 
se  0.016 0.017 0.014 0.015 0.031 0.035 0.072 0.072 0.016 0.016 0.006 0.006 
p  0.751 0.775 0.626 0.518 0.685 0.450 0.586 0.539 0.873 0.913 0.740 0.925 
-3  0.003 -0.017 -0.001 -0.020 -0.015 -0.029 0.008 0.020 0.003 -0.015 -0.007 -0.006 
se  0.015 0.019 0.014 0.016 0.030 0.034 0.077 0.076 0.015 0.018 0.006 0.007 
p  0.852 0.353 0.922 0.214 0.622 0.388 0.917 0.789 0.863 0.394 0.251 0.376 
-2  -0.020 -.034* -0.020 -.029* -0.015 -0.012 0.003 -0.009 -0.019 -.032* -0.004 -0.008 
se  0.017 0.019 0.015 0.017 0.031 0.031 0.082 0.093 0.016 0.019 0.006 0.007 
p  0.226 0.079 0.187 0.075 0.617 0.703 0.967 0.924 0.247 0.086 0.521 0.248 
-1 -.034*  -.054**  -.038**  -.061***  -0.051  -.085**  -0.013 -0.002 -.033* -.051**  -.020***  -.024*** 
se  0.018 0.021 0.016 0.019 0.034 0.041 0.085 0.085 0.017 0.020 0.007 0.008 
p  0.053 0.011 0.016 0.001 0.130 0.039 0.875 0.982 0.056 0.013 0.004 0.001 
0  -.184*** -.849*** -.185*** -.741*** -.190*** -.346***  -0.039  -0.120  -.174*** -.798*** -.041*** -.310*** 
se  0.026 0.039 0.023 0.033 0.042 0.045 0.083 0.100 0.025 0.038 0.008 0.015 
p  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.642 0.231 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1  -.135*** -.172*** -.153*** -.184*** -.215*** -.226***  0.017  0.014  -.125*** -.159*** -.032*** -.044*** 
se  0.025 0.027 0.022 0.024 0.050 0.051 0.074 0.077 0.023 0.026 0.008 0.009 
p  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.820 0.858 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2  -.080*** -.134*** -.081*** -.147*** -.092** -.196***  0.033  -0.003 -.072*** -.125***  -0.010  -.041*** 
se  0.023 0.027 0.020 0.025 0.044 0.060 0.075 0.090 0.022 0.026 0.009 0.011 
p  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.001 0.664 0.975 0.001 0.000 0.225 0.000 
3  -.066*** -.092*** -.070*** -.099*** -.089** -.128**  0.030  0.048  -.060*** -.083***  -0.003  -.025** 
se  0.024 0.029 0.021 0.026 0.044 0.059 0.075 0.075 0.023 0.027 0.009 0.012 
p  0.006 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.046 0.031 0.695 0.521 0.008 0.002 0.725 0.031 
4  -.044** -.071** -.062*** -.095*** -.133** -.186*** 0.011  0.027  -.043* -.066** -0.012 -0.015 
se  0.023 0.030 0.022 0.028 0.057 0.068 0.091 0.092 0.022 0.028 0.012 0.014 
p  0.049 0.018 0.004 0.001 0.020 0.006 0.906 0.773 0.052 0.020 0.344 0.297 
5 -.053**  -.050*  -.064**  -.077***  -.109*  -.178** 0.037  0.066 -.050* -0.044 0.001  0.013 
se  0.027 0.030 0.025 0.030 0.061 0.080 0.091 0.090 0.026 0.029 0.013 0.016 
p  0.049 0.098 0.010 0.010 0.074 0.027 0.683 0.465 0.054 0.127 0.915 0.412 
6  -.055* -.066* -.068**  -.085** -.124* -.153* 0.065 0.031 -0.049 -.062* 0.008  0.021 
se  0.033 0.039 0.030 0.036 0.067 0.082 0.100 0.139 0.031 0.037 0.016 0.020 
p  0.095 0.088 0.021 0.017 0.063 0.063 0.517 0.822 0.116 0.098 0.635 0.296 
7  -0.002 -0.036 -0.014 -0.049 -0.062 -0.085 0.123 .163** 0.005 -0.019 0.013 .060** 
se  0.039 0.048 0.035 0.043 0.068 0.083 0.077 0.082 0.036 0.044 0.023 0.028 
p  0.968 0.455 0.695 0.261 0.360 0.306 0.110 0.046 0.888 0.657 0.585 0.030 
Prob.>F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observ.  130816 130816 133098 133098 124754 124754 123116 123116 131460 131460 125930 125930 
Workers  9344 9344 9507 9507 8911 8911 8794 8794 9390 9390 8995 8995 
Table A.3 Notes: Standard errors are robust to residuals that are not identically distributed and to observations that are independent across 
groups (individuals) but not necessarily   independent within groups. 
 
  40A.4) Relevant Italian Labor Market Institutions 
 
 
Labor market Italian institutions such the “passive” CIG (Cassa Integrazione Ordinaria) and CIGS 
(Cassa Integrazione Straordinaria) policies  were already in place in 1985. Therefore we decided to 
introduce in our specification also a dummy indicating this temporary period of subsidization to 
industrial workers that are temporarily unemployed (but formally employed). Both subsidies have a 
wage replacement rate of 80% and benefit from it industrial workers (CIGS also covers retail and 
some services’ firms); however the duration of CIG is shorter (3 months) than that of CIGS (up to 3 
years during a period of five years). The last difference is that only workers employed in firms in 
bad economic situations with a minimum of 3 months of tenure are entitled for CIGS, whereas CIG 
have no other special restrictions. Moreover, workers displaced in collective redundancies (ex Law 
num.223/1991) and eligible for CIGS benefit from a (also additional to CIGS) subsidy with a 80% 
wage replacement ratio for a maximum period of one year. All workers displaced in collective 
redundancies, included those not eligible for CIGS,  are registered in a list of mobility, an institution 
aimed to facilitate the search process for a new job (e.g.: employer incentives to hire listed workers, 
plans of professional qualification and temporary social works). The ordinary unemployment 
benefit scheme is instead quite limited. It offers a low replacement rate (7,5% in 1985, 30% in 
1995; source: Bertola, Boeri Cazes, ILO, 1999) and lasts 6 months (to be eligible two year of 
contributions are necessary). 
 Active labor market policies aimed at re-training or resolve mis-match problems between supply 
and demand (such as: the employment service, training programs, youth measures, subsidized 
employment) were weak if compared to the other European countries. The Public Employment 
Service activities were, traditionally, simply limited to maintaining lists of registered unemployed 
as the basis to grant facilitations for hiring by large firms and the public sector. Therefore, 
placement services were not the focus of these placement offices. The literature suggests that the 
effectiveness of active labor market measures in preventing from unemployment is confined to not 
vast in scope policies and well targeted to specific local demand-offer needs (i.e., to the 
heterogeneous needs  of both workers and employers in local labor markets). They ranged from the 
“Contratti di formazione lavoro”, job training schemes especially directed to the young (whose 
  41training content and job career enhancing power is very doubtful
33), to public creation of “socially 
useful” jobs (“Lavori socialmente utili”) for the long-term unemployed and the never-employed  
and the introduction of  “Contratti di reinserimento”, tax and social charges rebates, for the long-
term unemployed.  
Italian employment protection legislation is reviewed in detail by Bertola and Ichino (1995). The 
regulation of job-displacement is, according to OECD’s studies, particularly strict with respect 
prevailing standard of and penalties for unfair dismissals. Table A.4 shows that during the first half 
of the period covered by the INPS sample unmotivated dismissals by commercial enterprises with 
more than 15 employees  is sanctioned with the reinstatement of the unduly laid-off employees and 
with a due compensation of at least five months pay. In 1990 small firms became subject to the 
provisions of law 15/07/1966, nr. 604: the employer can choose if re-hire or compensate the unduly 
sacked employee. Moreover with the same law (law11/05/1990, nr.108), the unduly laid-off 
employee has additionally the right to choose to be compensated (with 15 monthly payments) rather 
than reinstate. However, according to Bertola  and Garibaldi (2002), “employment protection was 
somewhat weakened by labor courts’ less restrictive interpretation of justifiable dismissals and, 
especially, by the collective redundancy procedures introduced in 1991”. 
     Although in Italy collective bargaining is often seen as the preponderant determinant of wage, 
the Italian industrial relations schemes have many other potential driving forces of wage 
determination (see Erickson and Ichino, 1993). Firstly, bargaining takes place at the national, 
industry and firm level. Moreover, variation in wages across industries and across firms in the same 
industry can happen also  through a different positioning of workers in the rank-ladder (with respect 





                                                 
33 According to Bertola  and Garibaldi (2002), the “Contratti di formazione lavoro”, that have a fixed duration and are 
associated to a payroll tax cut, should be interpreted more practically as contracts facilitating   temporary hires. 
Moreover, according to Rettore and Trivellato (2002), many subsidized hirings would have happened also in the 
counterfactual situation of absence of financial incentives. 
  42INDIVIDUAL DISMISSALS  
   Definition of 
unfair dismissal 








It is considered unfair 
a dismissal made 
without "just cause" 
(giusta causa) or 
"justified subjective 




1. In any 
case, it is considered 
unfair the 
discriminatory 
dismissal, which is 
caused by reasons of 
political credo or 
religious faith and by 
belonging to a trade 
union. 
The notice is due 




not for "just 
cause". 
   The dismissal is to 
be communicated 
to the employee in 
written form; the 
employee can 






The Act (and the 
relevant limitations on 
the employer’s freedom 
to dismiss) applies only 
to company employing 
more than 35 people.  
Law 
20/5/1970, 




It is a discriminatory 
dismissal also a 
dismissal caused by 
reasons of sex, race, 
and language. 
         Reinstatement and 
compensation equal to at 
least 5 months pay.
3  
Workers’ Statute: only 
for employers (of 
commercial companies) 
with more than 15 
employees in the same 




      [Annual 
salary/13,5] 
per year of 
service 
4




nr. 108 and 
collective 
agreement) 
   The notice period 
is fixed by 
collective 
agreements: blue 
collar: 2 days of 
notice is required 
when length of 
service is below 2 
weeks and 6 to 12 
days thereafter; 
white collar: 8 
days of notice is 
required when 
length of service is 
below 8 weeks and 
15 days to 4 
months thereafter. 
      For dismissal without "just 
cause" or "justified 
reasons"
5: for employers 
(of both commercial and 
non-commercial 
organisations) with more 
than 15 employees (5 for 
farms) in the same 
production unit or same 
locality and, anyway, for 
employers with 60 
employees in his staff 
(even if distributed in 
production units or 
localities with less than 
16-6 in agricolture- 
employees): reinstatement 
and compensation equal to 
at least 5 months pay. 
Besides the employee has 
the right to choose to 
compensate (15 monthly 
payments) rather than 
reinstate. The employee 
can (optional) request the 
conciliation through the 
Provincial Labour Office 
or the trade unions; often: 
agreement; if court: 
For employers with less 
than 16 employees (6 
for farms): re-
employment or 
compensation equal to 
2.5-14 months pay 
7. 
There is the obligation 
to an extrajudicial 
attempt of a 
conciliation through the 
Provincial Labour 
Office or the Trade 
unions; if the attempt is 
unsuccessful, the 
parties can turn to a 
college of arbitrators.  
  43always reinstatement 
6. 





(1) The justified subjective reason is when the employee runs into a considerable non-fulfilment of contractual obligations; the "just cause", which is 
also to be referred to the employee's non-fulfilment as the "justified subjective reason", differs from it only for the particular gravity, which is such as 
not to allow the continuation, not even temporary, of the employer-employee relationship (art. 2119 civil code and jurisprudence); the "justified 
objective reason" is when there are reasons concerning the productive activity, the labour organization and its regular functioning.  
(2) The employers can choose between the re-employment and the compensation.  
(3) The employer must reinstate the employee and also pay a compensation, proportionate to the total salary and in any case not less than 5 monthly 
payments, as compensation for the damage for the period between the dismissal and the reinstatement. There is not the possibility of choice as in the 
past and the reinstatement is different from the re-employment: the first involves the payment of the compensation for the period between the 
dismissal and the reinstatement.  
(4) The severance pay (trattamento di fine rapporto) is paid to all workers, in any case of separation and it is not considered a help for re-employment. 
(5) Rules of law 604/1966 extended to small firms; rules of Workers' Statute for the others.  
(6) Generally employers and employees do not turn to the court, but they come to an agreement through the Provincial Labour Office or the trade 
unions. Following a court judgement of unfair dismissal, the employee has always the option of reinstatement.  
(7) They can choose between the re-employment and the compensation, to the unlawfully dismissed employee, for the suffered damage: the 
compensation is determined by the judge between a minimum and a maximum fixed by the law; he must take into consideration the number of 
employees, the corporate sizes and employee's seniority (so the compensation can vary from a minimum of 2,5 to a maximum of 6 monthly payments, 
but it can be increased to 10 or even 14 monthly payments). 
 
SOURCE: G. Bertola, T. Boeri, S. Cazes (1999)  





   Definition  Exemptions  Procedural 
obligations 
Sanctions  Notice period Severance pay  Premium for 
agreement 
Social plans 





(lay off after a 
reduction or 
conversion in 




   Collective 
redundancies 
were subject to 
procedural 
limits, as the 










The law nr. 223 
fills the gap and it 




hypothesis of lay 
off: - collective 
redundancies: 
when the firm 
with more than 15 
employees, after a 
reduction or 
conversion in 
business or work, 
wants to dismiss 
Firms with 







to a complex 
information and 
consultation 
with the trade 








of the dismissal 
without written 
form, for the 
violation of the 
procedure (not 
only the lack of 
the information, 





the dismissal) or 
From 1 






(up to 75 
days). 
The employees 
of the firms 
subject to the 








ex law nr. 223, 
with a seniority 
of at least 12 
months (6 of 
which of 
The firms 
subject to the 
rules of the 
CIGS must pay 
to the SS a 
contribution 
equivalent to 6 
times the 
compensation 
of mobility in 
case of placing 
of mobility and 





of the firms 
subject to the 
rules of the 
CIGS, dismissed 
ex law nr. 223, 
besides 
benefiting by the 
compensation of 
mobility, are 
registered in the 




in the search for 
  44at least 5 
employees in 120 




the territory of a 
same province 
and this lay off is 
in any case be 
referred to the 
same reduction or 
conversion;          
-placing in 
mobility: when 
the firm admitted 
to the redundancy 
fun thinks it 
cannot guarantee 
the reinstatement 
to all suspended 
employees and it 
cannot turn to 
alternative 
measures. 
the rules of 
choice (the lack 
of the 
communication 
of the rules or the 
violation of the 
rules). 
effective work) 





10 for a 
maximum period 
of 12 months, 
which can be 
increased to 24 
for those aged 40 
to 50 and to 36 
for those over 
50: for the first 






dismissal, then it 
is reduced to 
80%. Severance 
pay (trattamento 
di fine rapporto): 
payable in 
addition. 
For both cases 
it is reduced to 







of the firms 
excluded from 
CIGS, dismissed 
ex law nr. 223, 
have the only 
right to be 
registered in the 
lists of mobility, 
not the right to 
benefit by the 
compensation. 
(8) Unlike other European countries, this is a subject different from the subject of individual dismissal.  
(9) Obligation for the employers to an immediate information in written form to the trade unions and to the Provincial Labour Office. The 
communication to the trade unions and the public authority must contain the information on the reasons of the redundancies; on the technical, 
organizational or productive reasons which do not allow alternative measures; on the number and the professional position and profile of the 
employees; it must contain also the possible social measures planned by the firm. The employee representatives can require a joint study (esame 
congiunto) in order to consider the possibility of different use for these employees, also by "solidarity contracts" (see Table 4) and the flexibility of 
working time (the agreements are so motivated). If agreement is not reached within 45 days, the Provincial Labour Office will act as mediator (for 30 
days). If agreement is not reached during this period, the dismissal may take place. The dismissal is to be communicated individually in written form; 
there is obligation to notice (from 1 month to 12 months) or the compensation, which is fixed by collective agreements; a list of the personal and 
professional data of the employees dismissed as well as the formalities of the enforcement of the rules of choice (if they are not fixed by collective 
agreements, they are: dependants, seniority and technical-productive and organizational needs; in the jurisprudence the last criterion prevails) is to be 
communicated in written form to the Regional Labour Office, to the Regional Employment Commissions and to the trade unions.  
(10) This particular unemployment subsidy is different and more favourable than the unemployment subsidy due to the other unemployed. The other 
European countries instead have only an unemployment subsidy.  
(11) There are plans of professional qualification, of temporary social works and of facility for employers who hire them. As the unemployment 
subsidies, also the measures to facilitate the search of a new employment are particular for the employees registered in the lists of mobility.  
SOURCE: G. Bertola, T. Boeri, S. Cazes (1999)  







  45A.5) Absence from the panel 
 
Table A.6 reports the  observed probabilities of absence from the INPS panel in a given year. These 
figures refer to the high tenure workers that during some years
34  are absent from the INPS archives, 
i.e. they exclude all workers that are present during all years in INPS panel (which were object of 
the econometric analysis). 
Other movers have the lower  unconditional probability of being out of the INPS panel as only-mass 
layoffs. Moreover ultimately displaced workers have a lower unconditional probability of being out 
of the INPS panel than other movers, whereas pre-closing separators have the highest one. 
However, once I take into account retirement, self-employment and quasi-dependent work (i.e., 
atypical job contracts), the three groups of displaced workers display an higher percentage of 
unexplained absence from the INPS panel (i.e.,  P(a  ∩ no info) ) than other movers.  
 
  P (a)  P (retirement | a)  P (self employment | a)  P (atypical contract | a)  P (a ∩ no info) 
Other movers  0.59 0.56  0.04  0.01  0.23 
Ultimately displaced  0.51 0.35  0.08  0.01  0.29 
Only-mass layoffs  0.59 0.41  0.08  0.01  0.30 
Pre-closing separators  0.72 0.49  0.05  0.00  0.33 
All workers  0.58 0.53  0.05  0.01  0.25 
Table A.6) Observed probabilities of being absent from INPS private-dependent sector archives 
during a give year. P(a) means probability of absence from the panel during a given year. 
 
The other possible causes of unexplained absence from the INPS panel are non-employment 
(unemployment or out of the labor force), agricultural or public sector employment and 
employment in shadow economy. Assuming that the probability of finding a job in the public or 
agricultural sectors is the same for all workers
35, these descriptive statistics would indicate that, 
during the years of absence from the INPS panel, displaced workers have an higher probability, 
with respect other movers, of being in a negative economic situation (non-employment or 
employment in the shadow economy). Therefore it is likely that my econometric estimates of the 
effect of displacement on  workers’ outcomes (and especially the results concerning employment 
prospects of displaced workers) are lower bound estimates. In other words, if one is willing to 
                                                 
34 By construction all high tenure workers are present in the panel till 1992; therefore these probabilities refer to years 
1993-1999. 
35 Moreover, according to Contini and Villosio (2006), such probabilities should be very low.  
  46accept that non displaced workers have better labor market perspectives than displaced workers 
outside the private dependent sector, than it is possible to argue that the estimated losses of 
displaced workers with respect non-displaced workers that remain in the INPS panel (that are 
provided by this paper) are lower bound estimates of the true losses due to displacement 
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